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I. INTRODUCTION
A husband and wife that file a joint income tax return are jointly and
severally liable for the full amount of tax liability.' Joint and several liability,
in federal income taxation, means that spouses are collectively or individually
liable for the entire tax due on a joint return. 2 Consequently, if one spouse does
not pay the tax due, the Internal Revenue Service may seek the whole amount
from the other spouse. In 1995, the House Ways and Means Committee ordered
the Treasury Department and the General Accounting Office to conduct a joint
study to determine if joint and several liability should be repealed.3 In response,
the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department issued a request for
public comment on the concept of replacing joint and several liability with a
proportionate liability standard.' The proposed proportionate liability standard
would hold each spouse liable for only that portion of the tax attributable to a
joint return that relates to that spouse's contribution to the aggregate joint return
tax liability of both spouses.
The most difficult issue that arises under a proportionate liability standard
concerns the allocation of items of income and deduction between the spouses.
The issue is further clouded by the differences in determining the amount of each
spouse's income depending on whether the spouses are domiciled in a communi-
ty property state or a common law property state. Under the rule of Poe v.
Seaborn,5 spouses domiciled in community property states must each report one-
half of the community's income on their separate returns, while spouses
domiciled in common law property states may choose between filing a joint
return and splitting their income or filing separate returns on which each spouse
reports only the income that the spouse earns.
This article will analyze the problems associated with joint and several
liability and the implementation of a proportionate liability standard in both
common law property states and community property states. Because of distinct
property'regimes, different problems may arise with respect to implementation
of the proportionate liability standard depending on whether spouses are
domiciled in community property states or common law property states. Part II
of this article will explain the origin of joint and several liability for the tax
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. I.R.C. § 6013 (1993).
2. Black's Law Dictionary 837 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Revenue Recognition Act, H.R. 2337, 104th Cong. § 13316 (1995).
4. I.R.S. Notice 96-19, 1996-1 C.B. 371.
5. 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct 58 (1930).
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liability on a joint return and the allocation of income tax liability in common
law property states and community property states. Part III will examine the
problems created by joint and several liability and the allocation of liability for
the tax on income earned by spouses in community property states under Poe v.
Seaborn.6 Parts IV and V will consider the congressional remedies for the
problems that result from joint and several liability and from the
application of Poe v. Seaborn, respectively. Finally, Part VI will discuss the
possible problems concerning the implementation of a proportionate liability
standard.
II. ORIGIN OF JOINT RETURN LIABILITY
A. Introduction of the Joint Return
Joint returns were introduced in the United States after the Revenue Act of
1918. However, the wording of the act did not allocate the tax liability
between spouses who filed a joint return.' In the Revenue Act of 1921,
Congress re-worded the section to state that a husband and wife may file
individual returns or include their income "in a single joint return, in which case
the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income."' However, it seems
Congress simply did not address the issue of joint return liability. Therefore,
without any guidance from Congress, the Bureau of Internal Revenue'0 drew
its own conclusion." In 1923, the Bureau made its first declaration on the
subject of joint and several liability.' Office Ruling Income Tax 1575 states
that "where a husband and wife file[d] a joint return they are individually liable
for the full amount of the tax."' 3 The Bureau of Internal Revenue reasoned that
"a single joint return is one return of a taxable unit and not two returns of two
units on one sheet of paper."' 4 Not all courts, however, adopted the Bureau's
position.
6. Id.
7. Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch.18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074.
8. Id. Section 223 stated:
That every individual having a net income for the taxable year of$ 1,000 or over if single
or if married and not living with husband or wife, or of $2,000 or over if married and
living with husband or wife, shall make under oath a return stating specifically the items
of his gross income and the deductions and credits allowed by this title. If a husband and
wife living together have an aggregate net income of $2,000 or over, each shall make
such a return unless the income of each is included in a single joint return.
9. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 223(bX2), 42 Stat. 227, 250.
10. Now known.as the Internal Revenue Service.
11. I.T. 1575, I1-1 C.B. 144 (1923).
12. Id.
13. 11-1 C.B. 144 (1923).
14. Id.
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B. Federal Income Tax Liability in Both Common Law Property States and
Community Property States5
In 1933, the Board of Tax Appeals decided Cole v. Commissioner." In
Cole, the Board of Tax Appeals stated that it was clear that the liability for the
tax due on a joint tax return was joint and several.'7  However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the spouses
were not jointly and severally liable for the deficiency that arose entirely out of.
the separate income of one of them.' The court's reasoning was based on the
Bureau of Internal Revenue's regulations dealing with capital gains and losses
that state, "a husband and wife, regardless of whether a joint return or separate
returns are made, are considered to be separate taxpayers." 9 Congress
overruled Cole in the Revenue Act of 1938, by providing that spouses are jointly
and severally liable for the tax due on a joint return.20 During this era, a
distinct standard of liability for spouses residing in community property states
was also created.
In 1921, the Attorney General issued an opinion stating that the wife in all
community property states, except California, had proprietary rights in the
community's property equal to that of the husband.' Consistent with the
Attorney General's opinion, the United States Supreme Court, in Poe v.
Seaborn,22 allowed a husband and wife in Washington to each report one-half
of the community's income on their separate returns. The Court reasoned that,
because any salaries or property received after marriage belonged to the
community and each spouse had a vested interest in the community, each spouse
was liable for one-half of the tax due on the community's income.23 This
decision mandates that each spouse in a community property state report one-half
of the community's income when filing separate federal income tax returns.
By the end of 1931, the Poe v. Seaborn rule was extended to all community
property states, including California.24 Poe v. Seaborn made the community
15. The Internal Revenue Service recognizes the following nine states as community property
states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington and
Wisconsin. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 435 (1921) and Rev. Rul. 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 20.
16. 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933).
17. Id. at 605.
18. 81 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1935).
19. Id. at 487.
20. Act of May 28, 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476.
21. . 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 435, 458 (1921); "The California courts have held that under the law
as it stood prior to 1917 the wife had no vested interest in community property prior to the
dissolution of the marriage .. " Id. at 461.
22. 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
23. Id. at 115, 51 S. Ct. at 60.
24. See Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. ]I8, 51 S. Ct. 62 (1930) (Arizona); Hopkins v. Bacon. 282
U.S. 122, 51 S. Ct. 62 (1930) (Texas) and Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 51 S. Ct. 64 (1930)
(Louisiana). The Treasury Department extended the Seaborn rule to the remaining four states. Mim.
3853, X-I C.B. 139 (1931). After California amended its community property laws to give the wife
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property regimes more appealing than the common law property regime because
spouses living in a community property regime could split their income by filing
separate returns. Because of the progressive tax rates, splitting the spouses'
income reduced the couple's tax liability. The reduction in tax liability is a
result of lower tax rates being applied to a greater portion of the couple's
income. Spouses are able to divide their aggregate income before it is taxed;
therefore, it is being taxed at a lower tax rate. For example, assuming A and B
file a joint tax return, and A's income was $70,000 and B's income was $0.
Without income splitting, their combined tax liability is $12,387 (15% x $40,000
+ 28% x $29,900)." However, with income splitting, their combined tax
liability is $11,040 (15% x $35,000 + 15% x $35,000).26 In response to cases
like Poe v Seaborn, common law property states began to adopt community
property regimes to take advantage of the income splitting rule.
To slow down this conversion and to obtain geographical equalization,
Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1948,27 which authorized married couples
residing in common law property states to split their income by filing a joint
return, hereinafter referred to as "income splitting."2 "Income splitting" allows
couples filing a joint return to divide their aggregate income into two equal parts
that are taxed separately. 29 As shown above, progressive tax brackets combined
with "income splitting" enables spouses with disproportionate incomes to lower
their taxes when filing a joint return, because part of the higher earner's income
is taxed at a lower rate. While Congress stopped the common law property
states from converting to the community property regime, it failed to equalize the
tax liability of spouses living under separate regimes.
As a result of Poe v. Seaborn, a spouse in a community property state is
prevented from filing a separate return that reports only the income that the
individual spouse earns. On the other hand, spouses in common law property
more than a "mere expectancy" in community property, the Supreme Court applied the Seaborn rule
to California in United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792, 51 S. Ct. 184 (1931).
25. The tax brackets come from the Internal Revenue Service, 1 996 Instructional Booklet for
Federal Income Tax Form 1040, at 53 (1996).
26. These tax brackets also come from the Internal Revenue Service, 1996 Instructional Booklet
for Federal Income Tax Form 1040, at 53 (1996).
27. Act of Apr. 2, 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114.
28. S. Rep. No. 80-1013, at 25 (1948). states in relevant part
Adoption of these income-splitting provisions will produce substantial geographical
equalization in the impact of the tax on individual incomes.... In effect, these
amendments represent the adoption of a new national system for ascertaining Federal
income tax liability. The adoption of these amendments will extend substantial benefits
to residents of both community-property and common-law (property] states.
29. SEC. 301. SPLITTING OF INCOME
(d) Tax in Case of Joint Return.-In the case of a joint return of husband and wife
under section 51 (b), the combined normal tax and surtax under section I I and subsection
(b) of this section shall be twice the combined normal tax and surtax that would be
determined if the net income and the applicable credits against net income provided by
section 25 were reduced by one-half.
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states have the advantage of being able to choose between filing a joint return
and splitting their income or filing separate returns on which each spouse reports
only the income of that spouse. The House of Representatives again attempted
to equalize the treatment of couples in community property regimes and common
law property regimes by making joint returns mandatory.3° However, the bill
was never enacted, and this distinction between the two systems remains
today.
Regardless of a spouse's ability to pay or the spouse's control over the
income, each spouse is jointly and severally liable for the entire tax due on the
joint return. This problem was significantly compounded when the United States
Supreme Court held that embezzled funds could constitute gross income to the
embezzler in James v. United States." Consequently, a spouse could be liable
for funds embezzled by the other spouse even if the spouse was unaware of the
wrongdoing.
In Scudder v. Commissioner,32 the Tax Court held Mrs. Scudder liable for
taxes plus interest and penalties on embezzled funds that her husband did not
disclose in their joint return. Mr. Scudder was embezzling from a company in
which Mrs. Scudder and her sisters were partners. When the unauthorized
withdrawals were discovered, the partnership accepted partial payment, and Mr.
Scudder remained liable for the balance. There is no evidence in the record that
any formal charges were ever brought. Mrs. Scudder argued that she was tricked
and defrauded by her husband into signing the joint return. However, the Tax
Court rejected this argument, stating that the signature itself must be a product
of the fraud, and Mrs. Scudder clearly signed the return voluntarily.33 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's
opinion and remanded it for further consideration, because both the partners and
the Tax Court treated these withdrawals as unauthorized loans.3 Therefore, the
transactions did not constitute embezzlement, and were likewise not taxable
income to the Scudders.
Had the partnership brought formal charges against Mr. Scudder, the
transactions would have constituted embezzlement, and the court would not
have been able to protect Mrs. Scudder from having to pay the
deficiency. As a result, Mrs. Scudder would have suffered a double loss.
As a partner she would have suffered a loss because of the embezzlement,
and as a spouse she would have suffered a loss because of the tax
liability. Cases like Scudder are illustrations of the inequities that may
arise when spouses are held jointly and severally liable for the tax due
on the joint return.
30. H.R. Rep. No. 77-1040, at 16.17(1941), reprinted in Misc., 1941-2 C.B. 413,420(1941).
31. 366 U.S. 213, 81 S. Ct. 1052 (1961).
32. 48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967).
33. Id. at 40.
34. Scudder v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1968).
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III. PROBLEMS WITH JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
A. Marriage as an Economic Unit
The imposition of joint and several liability for the tax incurred on a joint
return is based on the theory that a married couple is a single economic and
taxable unit (hereinafter referred to as the "unitary theory")." However, there
is no requirement that the spouses actually share any portion of their income to
qualify to file a joint return. In fact, it is not necessary that the couple even live
together.3' If the principle basis for joint and several liability is treating
marriage as an economic unit, then why do spouses have the option of filing
separate returns? Is a marriage an economic unit unless the couple chooses to
file separate returns? Is there any justification for holding the non-earning or
low-income spouse jointly and severally liable for the tax due on the joint return?Most people argue that the low-income spouse should be liable for the taxes
due on the income earned by the other spouse." After all, the low-income
spouse supposedly benefits from and enjoys the other spouse's income. Besides
the advantage of an additional salary, the low-income spouse further benefits
from the lower tax rates that apply when filing a joint return.3 There is no
denying that the low-income spouse typically benefits financially in some way
from the marriage. However, this benefit should not be the basis for income tax
liability. Even our present income tax system customarily attributes income to
the taxpayer who controls it, not the one who enjoys it. For example, under
Section 674 of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer is considered owner of
property placed in an irrevocable trust for the benefit of another, despite the fact
that the taxpayer enjoys no monetary benefit from the property.39 Likewise, in
some situations taxpayers who give away income from property that they still
own are taxed on that income.'° Besides being compatible with past legislation,
allocating liability to the one who controls the income is consistent with one of
the fundamental principles of taxation, that the incidence of a tax should be
based on one's ability to pay."'
35. Sol. Op. 90. 4 C.B. 144 (1923).
36. Congress repealed this requirement in 1944. See Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch.
210, § I I(a), 58 Stat. 231, 240 (1944) (amending § 51(b) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code).
37. This is the most common argument that arises when I discuss this problem with others.
38. Internal Revenue Service, 1996 Instructional Booklet for Federal Income Tax Form 1040,
at 53 (1996). If your filing status is single, your adjusted gross income from $0 to $24,000 is taxed
at 15% and your adjusted gross income from $24,000 to $58,150 is taxed at 28%. However, if your
filing status is married filing jointly, your adjusted gross income from $0 to $40,100 is taxed at 15%
and your adjusted gross income from $40,100 to $96,900 is taxed at 28%.
39. I.R.C. § 674 (1993).
40. See. e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144 (1940). The court taxed an
individual on income transferred from coupons when he retained the bonds. Id. at 118, 61 S. Ct at
147.
41. See, e.g., Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1935).
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The "unitary theory" seems to ignore this fundamental principle of taxation.
Presumably, most spouses do pool their income in some form or another.
42
However, pooling is not necessarily determinative of one's ability to pay. The
income may be pooled in a joint account, but one spouse may have greater
access to the account. One's control over the income governs his or her ability
to pay, and likewise should govern his or her tax liability. 3 As a practical
matter, the spouse who earns the income generally controls the income." Even
in community property states, which have equal management statutes, the spouse
who earns community income will normally be able to control its disposition.4'
The spouse who earns the income often decides the spending patterns or lifestyle
of the family. For example, a low-income spouse can be compared to a child
who receives money from a parent to go to college. The child undoubtedly
benefits from the financial help, yet the child does not incur any tax liability.
Granted, a spouse may have more of a vested right in the other spouse's income,
but it is still the earner who has the ultimate control over the disposition of the
income. Therefore, as a general rule, earned income should be taxed to the
person who earns it."
B. Why Do Spouses File Joint Returns?
Another question frequently asked is, if joint and several liability is so bad,
then why do spouses not file separate returns? The driving force behind filing
a joint return is the tax savings that can be achieved. The income tax rates that
apply to income reported on a joint return are significantly lower than the tax
rates that apply to income reported by a spouse on a separate return. The tax
savings are easily illustrated in single income families. For example, A and B
are married and their taxable incomes are $30,000 and zero, respectively. If the
couple files separately, their combined tax liability is $5,872. 47 In contrast, the
42. Majorie E. Komhauser, Love, Money. and the IRS: Family. Income Sharing. and the Joint
Income Tax Return, 45 Hastings LJ. 63, 86 (1993).
43. See, e.g., Mazzochi Bus Co. v. Commissioner, 14 F.3d 923, 931 and n.14 (3d Cir. 1994).
44. Komhauser, supra note 42, at 104.
45. Susan Kalinka, Federal Taxation of Community Income: A Simpler and More Equitable
Approach, 3 Wis. L. Rev. 633, 689 (1990).
46. See, e.g., Lucasv. Earl, 281 U.S. 111,50S. Ct. 241 (1930). In Lucas, the spouses entered
into a contract which provided that any property or income they received during marriage would be
owned by them jointly. The Supreme Court held that even though the contract was binding under
state law, salaries are taxed "to those who earn them." Id. at 113-15, 50 S. Ct. at 241.
In Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. I01, 117, 51 S. Ct. 58, 61 (1930), the Supreme Court distinguished
Lucas, explaining that Mr. Earl's salary was his property, whereas under Washington community
property law Mrs. Seabom had a vested interest in her husband's salary.
47. If a taxpayer's status is married filing separately, the taxpayer's adjusted gross income from
$0 to $20.050 is taxed at a rate of 15% and his or her adjusted gross income from $20,050 to
$48,450 is taxed at a rate of 28%. See Internal Revenue Service, 1996 Instructional Booklet for
Federal Income Tax Form 1040, at 53 (1996).
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liability for $30,000 reported on a joint return is $4,504.' With such monetary
incentives, Congress almost forces spouses to file jointly. Moreover, it is
unlikely that many taxpayers even realize that a joint return imposes joint and
several liability upon them, much less understand the intricacies of joint and
several liability. 9 A taxpayer usually discovers the joint and several liability
rule when he or she receives a letter from the Internal Revenue Service
concerning a tax deficiency. There is no warning or notice of liability on the
individual tax return Form 1040. The warning is placed in the instructional
booklet for the Form 1040.50 As a result, the spouse who prepares the return
generally is the spouse who sees the warning.
Assuming the low-income spouse was aware of the liability imposed and the
problems accompanying it, he or she may still be hesitant to question his or her
spouse's decision to file a joint return. Generally, a marriage is built on trust.
This type of questioning is a sign of lack of trust in the other spouse's ability to
properly compose the family's return. To ask one's spouse to change to a
separate return to avoid joint and several liability is like telling the spouse, "I
love you, but I just can't trust you." The overwhelming tax savings and the
desire not to express distrust for one's spouse are evident in the fact that ninety-
nine percent of couples who file tax returns elect to file jointly.5'
C. Spouse that Bears the Burden
Not only is joint and several liability unfair to the low-income or non-
earning spouse, but the results seem to be gender-biased as well. Women are
more likely than men to be subject to collection actions for joint returns.52 As
a result, women are more likely than men to seek protection from the "innocent
spouse" rules. 53 Because there are no statutory requirements that the Internal
48. If a taxpayer's status is married filing jointly, then the entire $30,000, up to $40,100, is
taxed at rate of 15%. Id.
49. Richard C. E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income
Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 317, 325 (1990).
50. Internal Revenue Service, 1995 Instructional Booklet for Federal Income Tax Form 1040,
at 20 (1995), which states in relevant part:
A husband and wife may file a joint return even if only one had income or if they did
not live together all year. However, both must sign the return and both are responsible.
This means that if one spouse does not pay the tax due, the other may have to.
5I. In 1985, 47,809,791 joint returns were filed and 895,789 returns for married persons filing
separately were filed. IR.S. Statistics of Income--1985 Individual Income Tax Returns, table 1.2,
at 16 (1988). Id. table 1.3, at 19.
52. Lisa Edison-Smith, "If You Love Me, You 71 Sign My Tax Return:'" Spousal Joint and
Several Liability for Federal Income Taxes and the "Innocent Spouse" Exception, 18 Hamline L.
Rev. 102, 123 (1994).
53. For a thorough discussion of the "innocent spouse".rules'see 'lnfra Part IV of this article.
From 1971 until 1990 there were, "299 reported cases in which ... § 6013(e) ["innocent spouse"
rules] was an issue, for an average of some 18 cases per year. In 1987 there were 32 such cases.
Using the cases reported during 1987 as a sample, only 2 out of 32 petitioners were men, both of
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Revenue Service first seek collection from the earning spouse, the Internal
Revenue Service usually goes after the easiest target. As one commentator
opined, the Internal Revenue Service is interested in collection in the quickest
least expensive way possible and will frequently collect from the available wife
rather than bear the expense of pursuing the absent husband. 4 Since the
Internal Revenue Service and the courts do not respect settlement agreements
between spouses," the only relief available to the spouse comes from the
"innocent spouse" rules.56 In an attempt to correct this problem, the Internal
Revenue Service enacted a new policy which permits its field personnel to pursue
the responsible spouse first before turning to the potential innocent spouse."
Under the new policy, field personnel are permitted to defer collection in
potential "innocent spouse" situations.'" However, this policy is discretionary
rather than mandatory, and there are no means of enforcing it.
D. Problems With Poe v. Seaborn
In addition to the burdens created by joint and several liability, spouses
residing in community property states have the additional burden of the rule of
Poe v. Seaborn. The problems created by Poe v. Seaborn are illustrated by cases
such as United States v. Mitchell" and Bagur v. Commissioner.' In Mitchell,
Mrs. Mitchell had little knowledge of her husband's earnings and even less
control over them. On several occasions she questioned him about the filing of
a joint return and relied on his assurance that a return had been filed. As
spouses often do, Mrs. Mitchell assumed that Mr. Mitchell was signing her name
on the returns. In fact, Mr. Mitchell neither filed any returns nor paid any taxes
for the years in question. For two of the years in question, Mrs. Mitchell was
employed as a teacher and earned a total of $4,200, from which taxes were
withheld. 61 In July of 1960, the Mitchells began to live separately and apart.
They were divorced in 1962. However, before the final decree of divorce, Mrs.
whom lost; 21 out of the 30 women petitioners that year also lost" Beck, supra note 49, at 327.
The "innocent spouse" rules are supposed to provide relief to spouses who are unjustly held liable
for joint return deficiencies. The "innocent spouse" rules are discussed to a greater extent in Part
IV of this article.
54. H.J. Cummins, Catch 1040: Joint Returns Mean Joint Liability- And in Some Cases. That
Means Trouble, Newsday, Jan. 30, 1994, at 76 (quoting Sharon Stem Gerstman, one-time
chairwoman of a tax subcommittee of the American Bar Association).
55. See, e.g., Kogut v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2781, 2783 (1992) and Winnett v.
Commissioner, 96 T.C. 802, 813 (1991).
56. For a thorough discussion of the "innocent spouse" rules see infra Part IV of this article.
57. Margorie A. O'Connell, Innocent Spouse Rules Can Avoid Unexpected Liability on Joint
Returns with Former Spouse, 17 Tax'n Law. 226, 228 (1989).
58. Id.
59. 403 U.S. 190, 91 S. Ct 1763 (1971).
60. 603 F.2d 491 (5thCir. 1979), revg and remg 66 T.C. 817 (1976).
61. Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 192, 91 S. Ct at 1765.
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Mitchell took advantage of then-existing Louisiana Civil Code article 2410, and
formally renounced the community in September of 1961. 6 As a result, she
was insulated under state law from the community creditors. However, because
she had renounced the community, she received neither a distribution of
community property nor a property settlement upon dissolution of her marriage.
Even so, the Supreme Court held that Mrs. Mitchell's renunciation was
ineffective against the federal tax collector. Therefore, Mrs. Mitchell was held
liable for one-half of the taxes her husband failed to pay during the years in
63question.
In Bagur v. Commissioner," the Bagurs maintained separate domiciles in
Louisiana from 1962 until 1968, when Mrs. Bagur obtained a divorce. Mrs.
Bagur's quality of life during these years is described by the appellate court as
follows:
Mrs. Bagur lived in grinding poverty, often with the utilities cut off,
sometimes with not enough to eat. Her three school-age children gave
her a little financial assistance from time to time. Mrs. Bagur's health
was poor; she was arthritic, anemic, and undernourished. Grounded
down but attempting to keep her head up, she worked sporadically in
1962, 1963, 1965, 1966.6
During these years, Mrs. Bagur received no support from her husband.
Nevertheless, the Tax Court held her liable for the taxes on one-half of her
husband's taxable income." The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit attempted to relieve Mrs. Bagur of this liability by allowing her to claim
a theft loss deduction under Internal Revenue Code section 165(c)(3) for the
portion of her husband's earnings to which she had a legal ownership claim but
to which her husband never gave her possession.67
In Louisiana, a theft occurs when anything of value which belongs to
another is taken or misappropriated without his consent or by means of
fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations.68 The definition of theft also
62. La. Civ. Code art. 2410:
Both the wife and her heirs or assigns have the privilege of, being able to exonerate
themselves from the debts contracted during the marriage, by renouncing the partnership
or community of gains.
63. Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 206, 91 S. CL at 1772.
64. 66 T.C. 817 (1976).
65. Bagur v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1979).
66. She was also held liable for the full amount of taxes on her earned income for the years
in question. Id. at 495-96.
67. Id. at 501-03.
68. La. R.S. 14:67 (1997) states in relevant part:
Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another,
either without the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of
fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations. An intent to deprive the other
permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential.
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includes the intent to deprive another permanently of whatever is the subject of
the taking. Therefore, to qualify for a theft loss deduction, the spouse seeking
relief must prove that the other spouse possessed the requisite fraudulent intent
to take or misappropriate the funds. In Bagur, the Fifth Circuit remanded the
case to determine whether Mrs. Bagur was entitled to claim a theft loss
deduction.69
This Fifth Circuit decision creates no real relief from the Poe v. Seaborn rule.
A theft loss deduction can only be claimed in the year in which it was discov-
ered,"0 and a refund can only be claimed within three years from the time the
return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever period
expires later.7' Therefore, not only must the spouse must file for a refund in the
year of discovery, but the refund must also be filed before the statute of limitations
for refunds run. However, the real problem is proving the requisite fraudulent
intent. As reflected in subsequent cases, proving that there has been a theft can
be an impossible burden for the spouse seeking relief.72 As a result, the theft loss
deduction provides no relief from the Poe v. Seaborn rule.
IV. INNOCENT SPOUSE RULES
Realizing the injustices created by joint and several liability and by the Poe
v. Seaborn rule, Congress enacted Section 6013(e) and Section 66 of the Internal
Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as the "innocent spouse" rules) to grant
relief to spouses who were not responsible for the tax deficiencies.73 As
69. The case was subsequently settled; no further findings of fact or opinions were rendered
on the issue of a theft loss deduction. See Schmidt v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 793, 796
(1981).
70. I.R.C. § 165(e) (1993).
71. I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1993).
72. See Rassa v. United States I.R.S., 634 F. Supp. 83 (D. Md. 1986) and Schmidt v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 793 (1981).
73. The text of I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1997) as originally enacted read as follows:
(e) Spouse Relieved Of Liability In Certain Cases
(I) In General--Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, if-
(A) a joint return has been made under this section for a taxable year and on such
return there was omitted from gross income an amount properly includible therein
which is attributable to one spouse and which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount
of gross income stated in the return,
(B) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return he or she did not know of,
and had no reason to know of, such omission, and
(C) taking into account whether or not the other spouse significantly benefited
directly or indirectly from the items omitted from gross income and taking into
account all other facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other spouse
liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such omission, then
the other spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and
other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent that such liability is attributable to
such omission from gross income.
Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971).
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originally enacted, Section 6013(e) provided an innocent spouse relief from
liability: (1) if items were omitted from gross income; (2) if he or she did not
know of, and had no reason to know of, these omissions; and (3) if it would be
inequitable to hold the spouse liable for the tax on such items, taking into
account whether or not the spouse significantly benefited directly or indirectly
from the items omitted. However, the 1971 legislation did not provide protection
from erroneous or fraudulent deductions or credits. In 1984, Congress liberalized
the "innocent spouse" rules to include relief from any "grossly erroneous"
items.74
Currently, the relief provisions under Section 6013(e) are not triggered
unless the spouse claiming relief establishes the following: (1) that a joint return
was filed for the taxable year(s) in question; (2) that the substantial understate-
ment of tax is attributable to grossly erroneous items of the other spouse; (3) that
the spouse seeking relief did not know, and had no reason to know, of the
understatement; and (4) that it would be inequitable to hold the spouse seeking
relief liable for the deficiency." In addition, the deficiency must meet a
predetermined amount set by certain dollar-based thresholds." It is very
74. The 1984 amendment to I.R.C. § 6013(e) states in relevant part:
(2) Grossly erroneous items-For purpose of this subsection, the term "grossly erroneous
items" means, with respect to any spouse-
(A) any item of gross income attributable to such spouse which is omitted from gross
income, and
(B) any claim of a deduction, credit, or basis by such spouse in an amount for which
there is no basis in fact or law.
I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1997).
75. Id.
76. The dollar-based thresholds of 1R.C. § 6013(e) (1997) read as follows:
(3) Substantial understatement.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "substantial
understatement" means any understatement (as defined in section 6662(dX2)(A)) which
exceeds $500.
(4) Understatement must exceed specified percentage of spouse's income.-
(A) Adjusted gross income of $20,000 orless.-If the spouse's adjusted gross income
for the preadjustment year is $20,000 or less, this subsection shall apply only if the
liability described in paragraph (1) is greater than 10 percent of such adjusted gross
income.
(B) Adjusted gross income of more than $20,000-If the spouse's adjusted gross
income for the preadjustment year is more than $20,000, subparagraph (A) shall be
applied by substituting "25 percent" for "10 percent".
(C) Preadjustment year.-For purposes of this paragraph, the term "preadjustment
year" means the most recent taxable year of the spouse ending before the date the
deficiency notice is mailed.
(D) Computation of spouse's adjusted gross income.-If the spouse is married to
another spouse at the close of the preadjustment year, the spouse's adjusted gross
income shall irnclude the income of the new spouse (whether or not they file a joint
return).
(E) Exception for omissions from gross income.-This paragraph shall not apply to
any liability attributable to the omission of an item from gross income.
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difficult for a spouse to obtain relief under the "innocent spouse" rules." These
requirements are conjunctive. Failure to satisfy any one will prevent the spouse
from obtaining relief." ' -To complicate matters even further, the spouse
claiming innocence has the burden of proving that he or she met all of the
requirements.79 Moreover, there are no uniform interpretations of these
provisions, leaving a range of diverse standards and unpredictable results in case
law."0 Each of the requirements under the "innocent spouse" rules will be
discussed in turn.
A. The Joint Return
The first requirement for relief under the 'innocent spouse" rules is that a
joint return must have been filed for the year(s) in question." This requirement
will obviously be satisfied if the spouse is relying on the "innocent spouse" rules.
If there was no joint return filed, the spouse would not be liable in the first place
and would not have to rely on the "innocent spouse" rules.
B. Grossly Erroneous
The requirement that the understatements are attributable to "grossly
erroneous" items excluded by the other spouse was one of the changes introduced
in the 1984 revisions."2 The inclusion of the words "grossly erroneous"
broadened the rules to include relief for deficiencies resulting from fraudulent
claims of deductions, credits, or basis, but only if they are "in an amount for
which there is, no basis in law or fact.""
The phrase "in an amount for which there is, no basis in law or fact" has
been difficult for the courts to interpret. For example, in Shenker v. Commis-
sioner,'4 Mr. Shenker held securities on account with White & Company, a
brokerage firm in which he was a shareholder. To enable White & Company to
meet the capital requirement of the Securities Exchange Commission, Mr.
Shenker executed an agreement in April of 1971 declaring that he would not
withdraw his stock from his account before April of 1972. Mr. Shenker's efforts
to aid White & Company were unsuccessful, and by March of 1972 the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation initiated proceedings to liquidate the
77. See supra note 53.
78. See, e.g., Kappenberg v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3132, 3133-35. (1994) and
Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11 th Cir. 1989).
79. See, e.g., Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1975).
80. Examples of these unpredictable results will be given in the following subsections of this
article.
81. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1) (1997).
82. 1.R.C. § 6013(e)(2) (1997).
83. Id.
84. 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 164 (1984), rev'd, 804 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1986).
1997]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
company. On their 1971 joint return, Mr. and Mrs. Shenker claimed a loss with
respect to the stock held on account with White & Company. The Tax Court
found that because White & Company remained viable in 1971 and Mr. Shenker
did not formally demand return of the stock until 1972, no loss had occurred in
1971.5 However, the Tax Court held that a loss did in fact occur; thus, the
issue was merely one of timing, resulting in a "basis in fact."46 As a result,
Mrs. Shenker was not afforded the protection of the "innocent spouse" rules, and
was found liable for the taxes due on the fraudulent deduction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court on the theory that not only must there be some basis that the loss occurred,
but that it occurred during the taxable year in question.' 7 The court held that
since the loss was not sustained in the year in question, there was no basis for
claiming the loss, and thus Mrs. Shenker did meet the "innocent spouse"
requirement.
A contrary view was taken by the Sixth Circuit in Purcell v. Commission-
er,"' when it affirmed the Tax Court's decision holding that there was some
basis in law or fact for the Purcell's deductions. In 1977 and 1978, Mr. and
Mrs. Purcell claimed deductions for non-business bad debts with respect to
International Demolition, a corporation in which they were both shareholders.
The returns were prepared by a certified public accountant who testified that he
believed the deductions were correct. International Demolition was in dire
financial straits during 1977 and 1978, but did not actually fail until several years
after the deductions were taken. Although the losses were not deductible in the
years in question, both the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit found that some
factual and legal basis existed for claiming the losses. The standard, therefore,
was not met. Although the Tax Court's position on this issue remains the same,
the opinions of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits are inconsistent. In fact, in the
concurring opinion in Purcell, the Sixth Circuit outwardly rejects the Eighth
Circuit's interpretation of the "innocent spouse" rules in Shenker.9
Such broad and varying interpretations of "basis in law or fact' make it
more difficult for a spouse seeking relief to meet the "innocent spouse"
requirements. The burden is also heightened simply because the evidence needed
to meet the standard may not be readily available to the spouse claiming relief.
As one commentator pointed out, if the innocent spouse is able to prove the lack
of basis for the disallowed deduction, then he or she may be caught in the
"proverbial Catch-22." 9 The Internal Revenue Service may argue that because
85. Id. at 167.
86. Id. at 167.
87. Shenker v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 109,115 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1068,
107 S. Ct. 2460 (1987).
88. 826 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 476.
90. Jerome Borison, Innocent Spouse Relief: A Callfor Legislative and Judicial Liberalization,
40 Tax Law 819, 854 (1987).
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the taxpayer is able to prove the erroneous deduction now, he or she should have
done so in the year in question. Therefore, the taxpayer would have had reason
to know of the understatement and, accordingly, relief should be denied on that
ground.9'
C. Know or Reason to Know
The third requirement of the innocent spouse rules is that the spouse seeking
relief did not know and had no reason to know of the understatement.92 Once
again, courts have had trouble interpreting this standard, and have increased the
burden of proof placed on the spouse claiming relief. A taxpayer is considered
to have knowledge of the substantial understatement when a reasonably prudent
taxpayer in the same position could be expected to have knowledge of the
substantial understatement.93 The Tax Court as well as several of the United
States Courts of Appeals have held that the knowledge contemplated by the
"innocent spouse" rules is knowledge of the transaction giving rise to the taxable
income and not knowledge of the actual tax consequences." However, the
Fifth Circuit in Reser v. Commissioner" and the Ninth Circuit in Price v.
Commissioner" have held that knowledge of the transaction itself does not bar
the taxpayer from receiving "innocent spouse" protection.
The courts consider a number of factors when determining whether the
taxpayer had reason to know of the substantial understatement. The relevant
factors are: "(1) The relief-seeking spouse's level of education, (2) his or her
involvement in the financial and business activities of the family, (3) any
substantial unexplained increase in the family's standard of living, and (4) the
culpable spouse's evasiveness and deceit about the family's finances." '97 These
factors are considered together.9 No single factor is dispositive."
The Tax Court has also imposed a duty on the spouse claiming innocence
to review the tax return and inquire about items that should cause a reasonable
91. Id.
92. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (1997).
93. See, e.g., Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1989).
94. See, e.g., Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470, 472 (6th Cir. 1987); Quinn v.
Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 1975); Kappenberg v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH)
3132 (1994); Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1261 (2d Cir. 1993); McCoy v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732 (1972); Langberg v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2981 (1994) and
Meyer v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 546 (1996).
95. 112 F.3d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 1997).
96. 887 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1989).
97. See, e.g., Langberg v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2981 (1994) and Bokum v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126, 148 (1990).
98. See. e.g., Langberg v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2981 (1994) and Bokum v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126, 148 (1990).
99. See e.g., Langberg v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2981 (1994) and Bokum v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126, 148 (1990).
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person to be suspicious under the circumstances."° In Langberg v. Commis-
sioner,' the Tax Court held that large deductions generally put a reasonable
taxpayer on notice that there may be an understatement of tax liability. This
duty of inquiry has even been interpreted to include more than mere reliance on
an accountant's assurance that everything was in order. 2 Likewise, a spouse
is not excused when he or she relies on the other spouse to handle the family's
finances. 'o3
Cohen v. Commissioner°M is another case where the Tax Court denied
relief on the basis that the spouse failed to inquire into the tax return. The basis
of the deficiency was Mr. Cohen's investment in the Barker Company, a
fraudulent tax shelter. None of the investors, including Mr. Cohen, a certified
public accountant and partner in the tax department of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., knew that the shelter was fraudulent. Nevertheless, Mrs. Cohen was
denied "innocent spouse" relief based on the fact that a reasonable person under
similar circumstances would have inquired into the deficient joint return. One
must question the court's reasoning. If relying on the validity of a return
prepared by a tax specialist in one of the world's largest accounting firms is not
considered reasonable, then what is?
On the other hand, there are cases where the courts seem to impose little or
no duty of inquiry. For example, in Reser v. Commissioner,'Os the Fifth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that Mrs. Reser, a successful attorney,
was entitled to relief under the "innocent spouse" rules. The foundation of the
deficiency was Mr. Reser's (an attorney with a degree in accounting) fraudulent
deduction of losses from his professional real estate brokerage corporation.'
6
The court stated that "in the 1980's, it was common knowledge that investors
could legally obtain large tax benefits through clever investment strategies."'10 7
Also, despite her educational background, albeit advanced, the court stated that
it in no way provided her with special knowledge of complex tax issues.0 s
Therefore, Mrs. Reser had no duty to inquire, and reliance on her husband's
assurance as well as their CPA's assurance was sufficient.
Another example of the courts' failing to impose a duty of inquiry is Guth
v. Commissioner.'" In Guth v. Commissioner, decided the same year as
100. Edison-Smith, supra note 52, at 115.
101. 67 T.C.M. (CCH)2981 (1994) (citing Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
102. Kappenberg v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3132 (1994). See also Hayman v.
Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1993) and Silverman v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH)
2631 (1994).
103. See, e.g., Steven v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1507 (11 th Cir. 1989).
104. 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1987).
105. 112 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir. 1997).
106. He had an insufficient basis in the corporation to take these deductions.
107. Reser, 112 F.3d at 1267.
108. Id. at 1268.
109. 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 878 (1987), aff'd, 897 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Cohen, the Tax Court granted relief to a wife whose husband invested in a
fraudulent tax shelter. Mr. Guth founded his own congregation of the Universal
Life Church and used it to create various fraudulent deductions. Mrs. Guth was
the treasurer of the church and had personally signed large checks, at her
husband's request, to her husband on the church's account. Nevertheless, the
court found that she had no reason to know of the fraudulent deductions. The
Tax Court did not mention a duty of inquiry. Had a duty been imposed, Mrs.
Guth may have been denied relief. The actual or constructive knowledge
requirement, based as it is on a factual inquiry, can lead to non-uniform results,
violating one of the principle goals of tax law: treating similarly-situated
taxpayers similarly."'
D. Equity Test
Under the equity test, the taxpayer seeking relief must prove that it would
be inequitable under all the facts and circumstances to hold the taxpayer liable
for the tax. Prior to the 1984 amendments, the language of the statute explicitly
stated that the court should consider whether or not the spouse significantly
benefited from the erroneous items."' Although this language was eliminated
from the statute, the courts still use the benefit test to determine the equity of
imposing the tax liability on the taxpayer." 2 Courts determine whether the
taxpayer significantly benefited, either directly or indirectly, from the items
omitted from gross income, exclusive of ordinary support."' As stated in
Sanders v. United States, this test can be quite ambiguous because "one person's
luxury can be another's necessity, and the lavishness of an expense must be
measured from each family's relative level of ordinary support. '" 4 In reality,
this test is not very different from the knowledge test. If the taxpayer is found
to have benefited from lavish expenses, it would be difficult for that taxpayer to
turn around and prove he or she did not have reason to know of the transaction.
Ordinarily, if a spouse is found to have a reason to know, he or she is found to
have benefited."'
110. Beck, supra note 49, at 352.
Ill. Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1,84 Stat. 2063 (1971).
112. H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, at 1502 (1984). The committee report explained:
The bill does not specifically require that the determination of whether it would be
inequitable to hold the innocent spouse liable include the consideration of whether such
spouse benefited from the erroneous item, but that factor should continue to be taken into
account.
113. See, e.g., Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164,1172 (1979) (citing S. Rep. No. 91-1537
(1970), 1971.1 C.B. 606, 608).
114. Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 168 (1975).
115. See, e.g., Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164 (1979) and Wright v. Commissioner, 64
T.C.M. (CCH) 1482 (1992).
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E. Dollar-Based Thresholds
Along with the inconsistent and burdensome jurisprudence, which makes the
attainment of relief from the "innocent spouse" rules nearly impossible, Congress
also created certain dollar-based thresholds as a rule of administrative conve-
nience which must be satisfied before relief can be granted."16 Unless the
"grossly erroneous" items exceed five hundred dollars, excluding interest and
penalties, the understatement is not considered substantial and does not qualify
for "innocent spouse" relief."'For items such as erroneous claims of deductions, credits, or basis to qualify
for "innocent spouse" relief, they must exceed a certain percentage of the
spouse's income."' These dollar limits do not apply to the portion of liability
attributable to the omission of an item from gross income."' When the spouse
seeking relief has an adjusted gross income for the preadjustment year of twenty
thousand dollars or less, the understatement must exceed ten percent of the
spouse's adjusted gross income for that year.' If the spouse's adjusted gross
income for the preadjustment year is greater then twenty thousand dollars, then
the understatement must be greater then twenty-five percent of the spouse's
adjusted gross income for that year to qualify.' 2' The preadjustment year is the
most recent tax year of the spouse ending before the date the deficiency notice
is mailed. 2
If the spouse has remarried by the close of the preadjustment year, he or
she must include the new spouse's income in his or her adjusted gross income
even if they do not file a joint return together.'23 Since this new spouse is not
obligated personally to pay the deficiency, his or her income should not be a
factor in calculating the innocent spouse's ability to pay. As a result, the
spouse's adjusted gross income will be incorrectly inflated, thus raising the
threshold that the deficiency must meet.
Although these dollar-based thresholds avoid insignificant claims, they can
make satisfying the "innocent spouse" rules even more burdensome. The poorer
taxpayers who really need the relief are denied it simply because it would be
inefficient for the Internal Revenue Service to process these claims.
In conclusion, the inconsistencies and inadequacies of the "innocent spouse"
rules, combined with the conjunctive nature and heavy burden of each require-
ment, prevent the "innocent spouse" rules from providing sufficient relief to
spouses in need.
116. .R.C. § 6013(e) (1997).
117. I.RC. § 6013(eX3) (1997).
118. .R.C. § 6013(eX4) (1997).
119. I.R.C. § 6013(eX4XE) (1997).
120. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(A) (1997).
121. I.R.C. § 6013(eX4)(B) (1997).
122. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4XC) (1997).
123. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(D) (1997).
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V. SECTION 66
In 1980, Congress attempted to provide spouses protection from Poe v.
Seaborn by enacting Section 66 of the Internal Revenue Code, which grants
relief to taxpayers in community property states." The original purpose of
Section 66 was to "provide relief for abandoned spouses who are presently taxed
on a portion of the income earned by the other spouse but (who] have received
no benefit from that income."'W2  In 1984, Section 66 was amended to better
protect spouses from tax liability on income from which they did not benefit. 6
124. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, §101, 94 Star. 3521.
125. S. Rep. No. 96-1036, at 8(1980), reprinted in 6 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7299.
126. Deficit Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424 (b), 98 Stat. 494, 802-03 (1984). I.R.C.
§ 66 (1993) provides:
§ 66. Treatment of community income
(a) Treatment of community income where spouses live apart.
If-
(1) 2 individuals are married to each other at any time during a calendar year;
(2) such individuals-
(A) live apart at all times during the calendar year, and
(B) do not file a joint return under section 6013 with each other for a taxable
year beginning or ending in the calendar year;
(3) one or both of such individuals have earned income for the calendar year which
is community income; and
(4) no portion of such earned income is transferred (directly or indirectly) between
such individuals before the close of the calendar year,
then, for the purposes of this title, any community income of such individuals for the
calendar year shall be treated in accordance with the rules provided by section 879(a).
(b) Secretary may disregard community property laws where spouse not notified of
community income.
The Secretary may disallow the benefits of any community property law to any
taxpayer with respect to any income if such taxpayer acted as if solely entitled to such
income and failed to notify the taxpayer's spouse before the due date (including
extensions) for filing the return for the taxable year in which the income was derived
of the nature and amount of such income.
(c) Spouse relieved of liability in certain other cases
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, if-
(I) an individual does not file a joint return for any taxable year,
(2) such individual does not include in gross income for such taxable year an item
of community income properly includible therein which, in accordance with the rules
contained in section 879(a), would be treated as the income of the other spouse,
(3) the individual established that he or she did not know of, and had no reason to
know of, such item of community income, and
(4) taking into account all facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to include such
item of community income in such individual's gross income, then, for purposes of
this title, such item of community income shall be included in the gross income of the
other spouse (and not in the gross income of the individual).
(d) Definitions'
For purposes of this section-
(1) Earned income
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A. Section 66(a)
To obtain relief under Section 66(a) the taxpayer must prove: (1) that the
spouses lived apart at all times during the calendar year; (2) that the spouses did
not file a joint return with each other for a taxable year beginning or ending in
the calendar year; (3) that one or both of the spouses have earned income for the
calendar year which is community income; and (4) that no portion of such earned
income is transferred, directly or indirectly, between the spouses before the close
of the calendar year.'27
If these conditions are met, then the income is taxed to each spouse in
accordancewith Section 879(a). Section 879(a) provides that the income is taxed
to the spouses as follows: (1) earned income is taxed to the spouse who
rendered the personal services; 2 (2) trade or business income, and a partner's
distributive share of partnership income, is treated as income of the spouse who
exercises substantially all of the management and control of the business, or who
is the partner; 129 (3) community income from separate property of a spouse is
taxed to that spouse; 30 and (4) all other income is taxed in accordance with
community property laws.'
Many spouses live together or have made some transfer of community
income at some time during the year. Thus, many spouses fail to meet the
technical requirements of Section 66(a). Consequently, Section 66(a) offers little
relief from Poe v. Seaborn. In fact, according to one commentator, there has
only been one case where a spouse has obtained relief under Section 66(a).'
Realizing the limited usefulness of Section 66, Congress added Subsections (b)
and (c) in 1984.
B. Section 66(c)
When a spouse fails to meet the requirements of Section 66(a), he or she
might still be able to obtain relief by satisfying Section 66(c). Under Section
The term "earned income" has the meaning given to such term by section
911 (d)(2).
(2) Community income
The term "community income" means income which, under applicable
community property laws, is treated as community income.
(3) Community property laws
The term "community property laws" means the community property laws of
a State, a foreign country, or a possession of the United States.
127. 1.R.C. § 66(a) (1997).
128. I.R.C. § 879(aXI) (1997).
129. I.R.C. § 879(a)(2) (1997) and I.R.C. § 1402(a)(5) (1997).
130. I.R.C. § 879(aX3) (1997).
131. I.R.C. § 879(a)(4) (1997).
132. John A. Miller & Jeffrey A. Maine, Tax Consequences of Communiy Income: Problems
and Planning Opportunities During Divorce, 30 Fain. L.Q. 173, 184 (1996).
[Vol. 58
COMMENTS
66(c), the spouse seeking relief must establish that: (1) the spouse did not file
a joint return for the taxable year;. (2) the spouse did not include in gross
income for the taxable year an item of community income which would be
treated under Section 879(a) as the income of the other spouse;" 4 (3) the
spouse did not know of, and had no reason to know of, such item of community
income;'" and (4) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it would
be inequitable to include that item of community income in the spouse's gross
income. 6 If a spouse meets these requirements, he or she will not have to
include in gross income the omitted item. Instead, the omitted item of income
will be included in the gross income of the other spouse.
The usefulness of Section 66(c) is limited by its technical requirements. Of
the four-requirements, the requirement that the spouse did not know and had no
reason to know of the community income creates the largest obstacle to obtaining
relief under Section 66(c). The lack of knowledge requirement has been
interpreted to preclude application of Section 66(c) in cases where a spouse had
knowledge of the income-producing activity instead of knowledge of the specific
income. "7 The factual test applied by the Tax Court is that the taxpayer must
"prove that a reasonably prudent person with her knowledge of the surrounding
circumstances would not and should not have known of the understatement,
keeping in mind her level of intelligence, education, and experience."'38 This
is the same burdensome requirement as the "know or reason to know" require-
ment of the "innocent spouse" rules.
Roberts v. Commissioner"' is one example of how difficult the actual-or-
constructive-knowledge burden is to satisfy. In 1975, Mrs. Roberts and her
former husband, Mr. Morgan, were residents of the community property state of
Texas, where Mr. Morgan had received several kickbacks from certain real estate
transactions. Mrs. Roberts did not know how much her husband earned for the
year in question, nor was she aware of the illegal kickbacks. Although the
couple enjoyed a lavish lifestyle, Mrs. Roberts was told by her husband that they
were living beyond their means. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's ruling that Mrs. Roberts was liable for one-
half of the tax on the unreported kickbacks.'40 The Tax Court reasoned that
Mrs. Roberts' knowledge of the existence of the real estate deal, which gave rise
133. I.R.C. § 66(c)(1) (1997).
134. I.R.C. § 66(c)(2) (1997).
135. I.R.C. § 66(c)(3) (1997).
136. I.R.C. § 66(cX4) (1997).
137. See, e.g., McGee v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1991) (quoting Costa v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1178, 1191 (1990), a.rd, 979 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1992).
138. See, e.g., Porter v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1217 (1991).
139. 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 94 (1987), affd, 860 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1988).
140. Roberts v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1988).
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to the kickback, and her general familiarity with the real estate business
disqualified her from attaining relief under Section 66(c)."
Section 66(c) most often precludes relief when a taxpayer in a community
property state suspects that the other spouse is not filing income tax returns
properly. In a common law property state, the taxpayer could file a separate
return. Yet, in community property states, even when filing separately, the
taxpayer is still liable for the tax on one-half of the other spouse's income unless
the taxpayer qualifies for Section 66 relief. However, a spouse's suspicion is
evidence that the spouse knew or had reason to know of the omission. According-
ly, a suspicious spouse may be disqualified from obtaining Section 66 relief.
C. Section 66(b)
Section 66(b) allows the Secretary to disregard community property laws,
such as allocation of half of the couple's community income to the other spouse,
where one spouse acts as if he or she is solely entitled to certain community
income and fails to notify the other spouse of the community income before the
return date. "2 However, Section 66(b) is not mandatory because itmerely states
that the Secretary "may" disregard community property laws and, therefore, it is
subject to selective enforcement. As a result, Section 66(b), like Sections 66(a)
and 66(c), provides minimal relief from the inequities caused by Poe v. Seaborn.
VI. PROPORIONATE LIABILITY STANDARD
Over the years, there have been several proposals for amending the "innocent
spouse" rules and Section 66. " This section will analyze the most recent
proposal, the enactment of a proportionate liability standard, and discuss its
implementation in both common law states and community property states. Under
the proportional liability proposal, each spouse would be liable for "only that
portion of the tax attributable to a joint return that relates to that spouse's
contribution to the aggregate joint return tax liability of both spouses."'"
A. Repeal of Joint and Several Liability
To implement a proportionate liability standard, joint and several liability
must be repealed. The joint return itself would be retained; only the method of
141. The Fifth Circuit held that the Tax Court's reasoning was not clearly erroneous. Id. at
1239.
142. I.R.C. § 66(b) (1997).
143. For a thorough discussion of the expansion and liberaiization of the "innocent spouse" rules,
see generally Borison, supra note 90 and Edison-Smith, supra note 52. For a thorough discussion
of the enactment of a strictly separate return system, see Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the
Income Tax, 67 S. Cal. L'Rev. 339 (1994) and Komhauser, supra note 42.
144. I.R.S. Notice 96-19, 1991-1 C.B. 371.
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allocating the liability would be replaced. The allocation of liability is a wholly
separate issue from tax rates and is independent of the majority of forms and
calculations of a return. Surprisingly,.joint and several liability may be repealed
without making any other changes in the tax system."5 However, Congress
may be hesitant to make this leap for two reasons: (1) the administrative
difficulties of identifying each taxpayer's individual liability on a joint
return;"54 and (2) the potential for fraudulent transfers between spouses in order
to avoid taxes." 7 Neither of these reasons poses a valid argument for prevent-
ing the repeal of joint and several liability and eliminating the grave injustices
that it creates.
B. Administrative Difficulties
Actually, a proportionate liability standard may not create such significant
administrative difficulties. Under a proportionate liability standard, each spouse
would be liable for that portion of the tax attributable to that spouse's contribu-
tion to the aggregate tax liability of both spouses.. There are currently several
situations where the determination of an individual's liability on a joint return
is required. When one spouse is a United States citizen or resident and the other
is a nonresident alien residing in a community property state, their individual
income must be identified and taxed accordingly." It is also necessary to
determine the amount of each spouse's tax liability when each spouse is due a
refund with respect to a joint return,149 and to determine, for estate tax purpos-
es, the amount of income tax that may be deducted with respect to a decedent
spouse's income tax liability.'" The service has adopted a formula for making
the determination. That formula is:
spouse's liability = (spouse's taxable income) (agaregate tax liability)
aggregate taxable income
Considering that the service already has adopted a mechanism for determining
the tax due on each spouse's income that is reported on a joint return, there
should be little problem in adopting a proportionate liability standard. The major
problem, however, is not with creating a formula, but determining the component
parts of the formula. More specifically, how does one determine each spouse's
taxable income. This problem will be addressed under the subsequent sections
entitled "allocation of income" and "allocation of deductions."
145. Beck, supra note 49, at 393.
146. Edison-Smith, supra note 52, at 127. See also H.R. Rep. No. 75.1860 (1938), reprinted
in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 728, 749.
147. See Cummins, supra note 54, at 76.
148. 1.R.C. § 879 (1997).
149. See Rev. Rul. 80-6, 1980-1 C.B. 296 (applying the separate tax method of allocation in
computing the refund).
150. See Tress. Reg. § 20.2053-6(0 (19!8).
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C. Interspousal Property Transfers
A proportionate liability standard may create the opportunity for abuse of
interspousal property transfers. A spouse could, pursuant to a separation or
divorce agreement, acquire property that is derived from income that was
unreported or fraudulently sheltered. Under a proportionate system, only the
earner or transferor would be liable for the tax due on that property. Therefore,
if the transferor was insolvent, the transferee would be able to enjoy untaxed
income. The Internal Revenue Service, however, may rely on state law of
fraudulent conveyances or federal bankruptcy law to set aside such
transfers.
The law of fraudulent conveyances allows the Internal Revenue Service to
set aside the transfer when it can prove that the transferor was insolvent at the
time of the transfer or that he or she later became insolvent because of a transfer
that was made without adequate consideration."s' In situations where the
Internal Revenue Service can prove that the transferee was aware of or
participated in the fraud, there is no need to show that there was
inadequate consideration." 2 By setting aside these transfers, the potential
abuse may be remedied. In fact, a proportionate liability standard would
create more beneficial results in this area because the Internal Revenue
Service would be pursuing the earner of the income and not the low-
income or non-earning spouse. A proportionate liability standard would lift the
unjustified burdens placed primarily on the low-income or non-earning spouse,
and they would no longer need to rely on protection from the "innocent spouse"
rules.
D. How Will It Work?
To truly appreciate the proposal, one must understand how a proportionate
liability standard will affect the basic workings of the current federal income tax
system. Under the current joint return system, the spouses' individual items of
income and deduction need not be determined to compute their tax liability.
However, a proportionate joint return system, like the current separate return
system, will require the determination of the spouses' individual incomes and
deductions to compute their individual taxable income. Because of the
similarities, a proportionate liability standard may have to borrow some
techniques from the separate return system.
151. Beck, supra note 49, at 402.
152. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a transfer from a husband to a wife may be
presumptively fraudulent without regard to the amount of consideration. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer
Act § 4(b)(I), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985).
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E. Allocation of Income
The calculation of income is the first step in determining a taxpayer's
taxable income. This section will analyze the affects of a proportionate liability
standard on the allocation of income and deductions. The allocation of earned
income is generally not very difficult. The majority of spouses can merely rely
on their W-2 forms. Yet, as one commentator pointed out, in a separate return
system there may be some incentive for artificial allocation of income in family-
owned businesses. 5 ' Couples may try to shift income from the high-earner
spouse to the low-earner spouse by decreasing the former's salary and inflating
the latter's salary. As a result, part of the high-earner's salary would be taxed
at the low-earner's rate, resulting in less tax due. Although proportionate and
separate return systems are similar in that they require the determination of each
individual's income, a proportionate system will actually lessen this incentive for
fraud. Under a proportionate system, the current joint tax rates will be retained
and the total tax due will be the same; only the allocation of tax will be changed.
Therefore, shifting the income will not decrease the tax due. For example,
assume A and B are married to each other and have taxable incomes of $30,000
and $10,000, respectively. If they choose to file separately, their tax liabilities
are $5,800 (30,000 - 20,050) x 28% + 3,000) and $1,500 (15% x 10,000),
respectively, for a combined tax liability of $7,300." If A shifted 10,000 of
his income to B their combined tax liability would be $6,000 (15% x 20,000 =
3,000 for each spouse), resulting in a $1,300 tax savings.'55 However, under
a proportionate liability system, A's and B's total tax liability would remain the
same, as any shifting would merely change the allocation of the tax.
Tracing and allocating income from property, although the majority of
couples do not live off of income from property, 56 may present a greater
obstacle. Simply stated, "there is more opportunity to manipulate a rule that
taxes property income to the owner than there is to abuse a rule that taxes earned
income to the owner."' 57 In common law property states, taxes on income
derived from property owned by one of the spouses individually could be
assessed solely to the owner. On the other hand, in community property states,
income derived from property owned individually by one of the spouses is
153. Zelenak, supra note 143, at 382.
154. If the taxpayer's status is married filing separately, the taxpayer's adjusted gross income
from $0 to $20,050 is taxed at a rate of 15%. The taxpayer's adjusted gross income from $20,050
to $48,450 is taxed at a rate of 28%. The tax rates are taken from the Internal Revenue Service,
1996 Instructional Booklet for Federal Income Tax Form 1040, at 53 (1996).
155. If the taxpayer's status is married filing jointly, the taxpayer's adjusted gross income from
$0 to $40,100 is taxed at a rate of 15%. The tax rates are taken from the Internal Revenue Service,
1996 Instructional Booklet for Federal Income Tax Form 1040, at 53 (1996).
156. Income from property constitutes only about 10% of all adjusted gross income. Zelenak,
supra note 143, at 384 n.216.
157. Id. at 384.
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generally considered community income.' 8 Therefore, the community will be
taxed on the income derived from the property, even if it is individually owned.
Currently, when spouses file separate returns, income from community and
jointly owned property is divided equally between the spouses.' 59 A propor-
tionate system could adopt this approach or create a new standard.
Instead of dividing the income equally, the income could be allocated in
proportion to each spouse's ownership interest in the property. "O However,
under community property law, each spouse has an undivided one-half ownership
interest in each item of community property.'' To compensate for community
property law, a better standard may be to allocate the property income in
proportion to each spouse's control over the property and income from the
property. Determining a spouse's control may be a difficult task. Does the main
wage earner always control all the couple's property and its income? The main
wage earner may not always control the property or its income, but arguably he
or she did at the time the property was purchased. The decision to allow the
lower-income spouse to control the property or its income can be seen as control
in itself. On the other hand, in the situation where the spouses have comparable
incomes, it may be impossible to determine who controls the property or its
income. The best gauge for measuring control may be looking to see in whose
name the property is titled. If a stock dividend is issued on stocks owned by the
community, but titled under the name of only one of the spouses, the dividend
check will be issued to the named spouse. Although the spouse who controls the
income may not retain it solely for himself or herself, he or she is in a better
position to pay taxes on it.
F. Allocation of Deductions
The next step in determining a taxpayer's taxable income is to subtract the
deductions allocated to the taxpayer from the income allocated to him or her.
Under the current federal income tax system, spouses who file a joint return are
entitled to claim a standard deduction or itemize their deductions. 62 The
158. See La. Civ. Code art 2339 which states in relevant part:
The natural and civil fruits of the separate property of a spouse, minerals produced from
or attributable to a separate asset, and bonuses, delay rentals, royalties, and shut-in
payments arising from mineral leases are community property. Nevertheless, a spouse
may reserve them as his separate property by a declaration made in an authentic act or
in an act under private signature duly acknowledged.
See also Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 5.02 (West 1997) which states in relevant part, "[p]operty
possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community
property. The degree of proof necessary to establish that the property is separate property is clear
and convincing evidence."
159. See, e.g., Finney v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1976).
160. Zelenak, supra note 143, at 390.
161. For example, La. Civ. Code art 2336.
162. .RC. § 63(c)(6)(A) (1997).
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standard deduction is based on the presumption that the couple has itemized
deductions equal in size. 63. Therefore, the standard deduction should be treated
the same as the rest of the personal deductions. Under a proportionate liability
standard, deductions associated with earned income could be allocated to the
spouse reporting that income, and personal deductions could be allocatedbetween
the spouses. Again, a proportionate system could incorporate rules used in the
separate return. Generally, when filing a separate return, deductible items paid
out of community or jointly owned funds are divided equally between the
spouses unless one spouse can prove the funds were his or her's individually.'"
For example, where medical expenses are paid out of a joint checking account,
there is a rebuttable presumption that each spouse pays one-half of the
expenses."' However, under this rule, the spouse who controls the income
would be taxed on the full amount while he or she would only be allowed to
claim half of the deduction. There are two recent proposals to solve this
problem in a proportionate system: (1) allocate deductions between the spouses
in proportion to their respective adjusted gross income;'" or (2) allocate
deductions entirely to the higher-income spouse until the deductions have
equalized their taxable incomes, and after that allocate deductions evenly between
the spouses.6 7 If the spouses fail to cooperate in disclosing their incomes,
each would be allocated fifty percent of the deductions. While each of these
proposals present plausible solutions, perhaps the best solution would be to
allocate deductions to the spouse who has control over the funds.
Concerning the deduction of items paid out of separately-owned funds, a
proportionate liability system could adopt the rules currently used on a separate
return. Items paid out of separately owned funds are usually deductible only by
the payor, regardless of whose obligation it was. 68 When the source of the
funds is indeterminable, the courts have divided the deduction equally between
the spouses. 69 On the other hand, certain items are deductible only by the
spouse who both incurs and pays the expense. Mortgage payments are not
deductible unless paid by the obligor."0  Charitable donations are only
deductible by the owner of the property donated.' 7' Casualty losses and
investment losses are only deductible by the owner of the property lost.
172
163. Zelenak, supra note 143, at 394.
164. Rev. Rul. 55-479, 1955-2 C.B. 57..
165. Rev. Rul. 59-66, 1959-1 C.B. 60.
166. Beck, supra note 49, at 399.
167. Zelenak, supra note 143, at 395.
168. See, e.g., Jolson v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1184 (1944).
169. See. e.g.. Finney v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504, 1508 (1976).
170. See. e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 868 (1980), affid, 652 F.2d 54 (2d
Cir. 1981).
171. See. e.g., Stewart v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 406, 411, (1937), afld, 95 F.2d 821 (5th
Cir. 1938).
172. Loewenstein v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112 (1968).
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Medical expenses are deductible by the spouse who paid them.' 7  However,
rules pertaining to the allocation of deductions can not be converted to a
proportionate liability system without some new problems.
The most obvious problem associated with allocating deductions vis-h-vis a
proportionate liability standard is the necessity of detailed recordkeeping. Since
the majority of married couples file joint returns,' couples are not accustomed
to keeping track of whose income paid which deductions. Requiring them to do
so will create a heavy burden. However, this burden seems justified when
weighed against the problems created by the joint and several liability standard.
In conclusion, the proportionate liability standard would hold each spouse
liable for only that portion of the tax attributable to a joint return that relates to
that spouse's contribution, taxable income,'" to the aggregate joint tax liability
of both spouses.
G. Fraudulent Deductions and Credits
As explained in Part II of this article, the "innocent spouse" rules provide
little relief to a taxpayer whose spouse fraudulently claims deductions or credits
or has omitted income entirely. A proportionate liability standard, if correctly
written, would eliminate the need for the innocent spouse rules. By
developing a method that recalculates each spouse's portion of the
aggregate joint return tax each time a fraudulent deduction, credit, or
omission is discovered, each spouse would remain liable for only his or her share
of the tax. This recalculation only requires the employment of simple math and
would not be complex or difficult to administer. Such a procedure would insure
predictable and equitable results that a spouse, who actually is innocent, could
rely on.
H. The Effects of a Proportionate Liability Standard in Community Property
States
A proportionate liability standard, despite its advantages, may not have any
effect on the allocation of tax liability in community property states. The
reasoning of Poe v. Seaborn is not based on joint and several liability, but on the
principle that both spouses have equal rights to community property.' 76 In Poe
v. Seaborn, the United States Supreme Court held that each spouse had to report
one-half of the community's income on their separate individual returns.
Therefore, the implementation of a proportionate liability standard will not
correct the inequities created by Poe v. Seaborn. As long as Poe v. Seaborn
173. Rev. Rul. 55-479, 1955-2 C.B. 57.
174. See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 51, at 16.
175. Based on property controlled by that spouse.
176. 282 U.S. 101, 111,51 S. Ct. 58, 59(1930).
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remains good law, spouses in community property states will continue to be
liable for one-half of the community's income. Most commentators as well as
this author agree that overruling Poe v. Seaborn is an essential step in the reform
of community property income tax laws.' However, even if Poe v. Seaborn
is overruled, proportionate liability may still not have the desired effect of
allocating tax liability solely to the earner.
In a proportionate liability system, only the earning spouse would be liable
for the tax due on his or her income. However, according to state community
property laws, debts incurred by either spouse during the marriage for the benefit
of the community are community debts.""' Thus, community creditors may
seek satisfaction of these debts from all community property. The individual tax
liability of the spouses would be classified as a community debt, and the Internal
Revenue Service could enforce the earning spouse's federal tax obligation against
the community's property. Although the other spouse would not be personally
liable for the earning spouse's taxes, he or she would be liable for his or her
share of the community's debt. Therefore, the non-earning or low-income spouse
would still be subjected to tax liability on income he or she did not earn. To
resolve this problem, the proportionate liability standard created would have to
intentionally preempt community property law. Without this preemption, a
proportionate liability standard would unjustly discriminate against spouses in
community property states. However, Congress may be hesitant to preempt state
law in this field. Why should the Internal Revenue Service be placed in a
position different from any other creditor of the community?
VII. CONCLUSION
A proportionate liability standard could be fashioned so as to resolve some
of the major problems created by joint and several liability. By allocating the
income and deductions from property in proportion to each spouse's control over
the property, innocent spouses, such as the ones mentioned in this article, would
not be held liable for taxes on income over which they had little or no control.
A proportionate liability standard would also be consistent with the principle that
the incidence of tax is based on the taxpayer's ability to pay. However, if the
search is for a system that is fair to all taxpayers no matter what property regime
they reside in, then the enactment of a proportionate standard is not enough.
Along with the implementation of a proportionate liability standard, Poe v.
Seaborn would have to be overruled and Congress would have to preempt state
community property laws. In conclusion, a proportionate liability standard may
177. See, e.g., John A. Miller, Federal Income Taxation and Community Property Law: The
Case for Divorce, 44 Sw. LJ. 1087, 1133 (1990); Kalinka, supra note 45, at 704 and Zelenak, supra
note 143, at 378.
178. W.S. McClanahan, Community Property Law in the United States § 10:4, at 484 (1982).
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not solve all the problems of the current system, but it would undoubtedly be the
lesser of the two evils.
John Allain Viator
